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by Dr. A.J.W. van de Gevel.
1. Introduction.
From the business survey undertaken in 1987 by G. Nerb
for the "Costs of Non-Europe" project as higlighted in the
Cecchini report it appears clearly that technical barriers to
trade are ranked as one of the most important obstacles
preventing the completion of the internal market.
The Community policy for the removal of technical
barriers to trade has not been born yesterday. The policy has
evolved in a piecemeal way over a number of years, has
progressed in leaps, moving ahead whenever it became clear
that less than radical solutions would be inadequate.
This paper presents a description of the Community policy
to eliminate technical barriers to trade. In the first
paragraph of this article we identify the problem of technical
barriers to trade, its types, characteristics, importance and
costs. In the second paragraph we discuss the EC policy to
eliminate technical barriers, i.e. the legal regime and the
harmonisation policy in its old and new approach. In the third
paragraph we evaluate the EC strategy for the removal of
technical barriers and we formulate a few conclusions.
2. The Problem: Types, Characteristics, Importance and Costs
of technical barriers.
2.1. Types of technical barriers to trade.
Since the publication of the Cecchini report in 1988 it
is common to consider technical barriers as consisting of
three forms:
- differences between countries in product regulations,
such as e.g. the Italian Pasta Purity Law;
- differences between countries in industry standards, such
as e.g. the French building tiles standards;
- repeated conformity assessment, such as e.g. in
pharmaceuticals where each EC country requires a separate
market authorisation before admission to a particular national
market is provided.
In the first and second category of technical barriers
imports from other countries must be physically adapted to
comply with domestic regulations and standards. The testing of
imports to ensure that they have been correctly adapted to
local regulations and standards gives rise to the third type
of technical barriers.2
However, it is more appropriate to make a distinction
between rules based technical barriers, also encompassing
mandatory conformity assessment procedures and market based
technical barriers including voluntary conformity assessment
procedures. This distinction draws attention to the fact that
there are in fact two worlds in which technical barriers
manifest themselves, a rules based world which is in public
hands, and a market based world which is in private hands.
2.2.1. Technical regulations.
Technical regulations are mandatory specifications as to
the form, construction, performance of products and services,
as well as processes and methods. They are enshrined in laws
adopted by parliament and enforced by public agencies.
Products which do not comply with the regulations are illegal
and cannot be legally sold on the market.
The most significant side-effect of national technical
regulations are the possible negative consequences for
international trade, because partner country products may be
excluded from the domestic market unless they conform to local
compulsory specifications and they can give rise to legally
enforceable import prohibitions.
A very famous example is the Italian Pasta Purity Law of
July 1967 which specified that "pasta" had to be composed of
durum wheat only. This implied that a British-made pasta
composed of both durum and soft wheat was not allowed to enter
Italy under the name of "pasta". Durum wheat used in the
production of pasta was produced by a relatively small but
powerful group of farmers in the southern part of the country.
Pressure exerted by this group had led to protracted
enforcement of this legislation in Italy. The official
explanation was to protect the consumer from poor quality
pasta, something the consumer might do for himself by not
purchasing it. In fact, the consumption of mixed pasta did not
pose a health risk and there was no reason to assume that
mixed pasta, which was typically associated with lower quality
at lower prices, would drive out pasta made from durum wheat.
On 14 July 1988, the European Court of Justice declared this
law incompatible with article 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty. The
motive to this judgment was case 90~86 against Zoni, an
Italian wholesale dealer who imported pasta composed of a
mixture of durum and soft wheat and who was accused to violate
the Past Purity Law.
The background study for the Cecchini report by the MAC
Group calculated that the removal of the Pasta Purity Law
would permit penetration of the Italian mixed pasta market
amounting to between 10 and 20 per cent of total pasta
consumption in Italy. The direct cost savings that could
accrue to consumers are of the order of 20-60 million ECU per
year. If analogous rules were scrapped in France and Greece,
an aggregate benefit for the Community as a whole of 35-100
million ECU could be achieved.3
?,?.?. 7ndustry standards.
A standard is "a document, established by consensus and
approved by a recognised body, that provides, for common and
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for
activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the
optimum degree of order in a given context."(ISO Guide 2,
1991) .
It is the voluntary character which distinguishes
standards from regulations. Furthermore, as defined, standards
are agreed by consensus within specialist standards bodies
consisting of the main interested parties. This collective
setting of standards, and their wide field of application,
sets standards apart from producer specifications which are
specific to an individual firm. However, sometimes product
specifications used by the market-leader may emerge as a"de
facto" industry standard, where smaller producers may "follow-
the-leader".
Voluntary industry standards can pose formidable
obstacles to market entry and they give rise to technical
trade barriers in much the same way as product regulations.
Often firms in other countries are standard-takers and they
must adapt to local standards if they are to compete on a
level playing field with domestic producers. Standards become
technical barriers if the economic activity of customers and
suppliers is inhibited by apparently arbitrary imposition of
national standards by law, regulation or administrative
action.
An example of the quite subtle way in which trade is
hindered is the case of the French building tiles standards.
In France domestic tile manufacturers, whose market position
was under assault from Italian and Spanish competitors, worked
through AFNOR to create an especíally stringent standard for
tiles (UPEC). Tiles made to this standard were noticeably
thicker than tiles produced in other countries. The bulkiness
of these tiles increased the associated transport costs. It is
widely admitted that this standard is overly restrictive with
respect to the essential requirements it is designed to
protect. Non-standard tiles may still be sold in France but
they may not be used in public works (40 per cent of the
marketj as a result of the practice of the public authorities
of referring to the AFNOR standard in tenders for public
supply contracts. Moreover, the non-government market for
building tiles is also effectively closed off because French
insurance companies require use of tiles made to AFNOR
specifications. This clause allows the insurance companies to
reject any damages claims arising from the use of tiles not
made according to AFNOR specifications. Consequently,
architects and builders are reluctant to use foreign tiles
which have the same quality but that do not comply to French
standards.4
2.2.3. Conformity assessment.
Conformity assessment comprises not only all activities
undertaken to ensure that products comply with specifications
laid down in industry standards and public regulations, but
covers a much wider field, involving testing, quality systems,
certification and accreditation. Accreditation involves all
actions to determine the technical competence and impartiality
of third parties with testing and certification
responsibilities, so that confidence in these bodies is
generated and maintained. Moreover, there is the problem of
ensuring that the organisations which carry out conformity
assessment do so in a competent and correct manner.
It is important to distinguish assessment of conformity
with regulations from assessment of conformity with industry
standards.
i). Conformity with regulations. Here there is a legal
obligation to submit products to a recognised body for
conformity assessment. Only products which satisfy the various
tests can be legally marketed. In this case conformity
assessment is intended to ensure an equal and effective
application of the law. The task of checking conformity with
mandatory technical regulations is assigned to public, semi-
public bodies or to approved private sector institutions
("notified bodies"). Occasionally, it is left to the producer
to ensure that products match the regulatory requirements,
whereby a manufacturer's declaration of conformity will be
sufficient to allow the product entry to the market.
iij. Conformity with industry standards. In the case of
industry standards, conformity assessment is often voluntary.
However, firms are eager to have objective attestation and to
signal to the market that their product possesses the
desirable qualities embodied in the industry standard, whereby
recognised marks of conformity or certificates boost consumer
confidence in the product. Therefore, certificates and marks
of conformity are the visible endorsement from a recognised
body that the product corresponds to certain standards.
A trade barrier is coming into existence if a producer
has to adapt his product to meet the specifications of the
importing country regulation, or has to adapt the product to
local standards, and if, once he has done so, he must submit
the product for testing and certification to testing bodies in
the importing country. The result may well be that a product
must be approved by twelve different administrative
procedures. In many cases, components have to be shipped to
the testing body in the importing country and then repatriated
for inclusion in the end-product.
The expenses associated with this kind of activity, in
the form of fees charged by the testing bodies, and delays in
bringing a product to the market, are borne by the producer.
(There are up to 10000 independent laboratories and 1000
certification bodies operating in the EC.) Moreover, tracking
down the necessary information and preparing documentation
imposes in-house costs on firms.5
Despite some legitimate reservations about technical
competence of bodies in partner countries, much duplication of
conformity assessment is unnecessary and wasteful, and may
even be consciously manipulated for protectionist purposes.
2.3. Importance of technical barriers.
With respect to the importance of technical barriers by
sector, the Cecchini report has shown that generally speaking,
trade in investment goods is more severly disrupted than trade
in consumer and intermediate goods, in that order. Technical
barriers represent the most significant impediment to intra-EC
trade in the following sectors: plastics, non-metallic mineral
products, chemicals, metal articles, mechanical engineering ,
electrical engineering, motor vehicles and other transport
equipment. However, other sectors, such as textiles and man-
made fibres, mineral oil refining and office equipment, seem
to be relatively free from the scourge of technical barriers.
In these sectors other trade barriers such as administrative
barriers and customs formalities are more important.
The Nerb survey also has found that smaller firms (less
than 50 employees) considered technical barriers of secondary
importance as an obstacle to trade while larger firms (more
than 1000 employees) ranked technical barriers as the most
formidable trade barriers.
Another interesting finding was that companies in large
countries consistently ranked technical barriers as a more
serious barrier to trade than firms in smaller member
countries. Companies located in smaller countries have
apparently learned to deal with the problem of technical
barriers by making widespread use of technical specifications
applied in the larger countries.
Table 1(taken form the MAC Group background study for
the Cecchini report) illustrates the three forms or
combinations thereof, that technical trade barriers can take
in six industries.
2.4. Costs of technical barriers.
The economic impact of technical barriers can be
expressed in terms of the cost of their presence or the
benefits of their removal, there is no difference:
- Higher production, distribution and inventory costs which
are generally passed on to consumers in the form of higher
prices.
- Unexploited economies of scale due to the smaller size of
the market.
- The lack of competition sows the seeds for bad management
and inefficient production methods ("X-inefficiency").
The MAC Group background study has provided some
estimates of the immediate cost saving to producers from the~ Cl.
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removal of six selected barriers illustrated in table 2.
Because there were 100000 different technical barriers in
place in the EC it was out of the question to make a separate
calculation for each of these. Therefore, the Cecchini report
has made an indirect estimate through the observation of price
discrepancies, referring to a number of supply-side
imperfections, not only the removal of technical barriers. The
estimates of the total microeconomic gains from completing the
internal market over six years are presented in table 3.
Table 3
Microeconomic gains from the completion of the internal
market. (EUR 7, based on data for 1985, at 1985 prices)
billion ECU ~ GDP
(average of variants)
Barrier removal effects 72.5 2.45
Economies of scale 60.5 2.05
Competition effects 46 1.6
Total 179 6.1
Source: The Economics of 1992. Table 10.1.1, page 157.
European Economy, No. 35, March 1988.
In macroeconomic terms, without accompanying economic
policy measures, the completion of the internal market is
estimated to create 1.8 million new jobs. Taking into account
an easing of the public finance and external balance
constraints the additional employment is expected to be 5
million in the medium term. (The margin of error is 30~.)
3. The EC Policy to eliminate technical barriers.
Since for industry, technical barriers create serious
inhibitions to intra-EC trade, a common system of regulations,
industry standards and uniform conformity assessment practices
would seem the first best solution. However, harmonisation
carries with it a host of disadvantages.
3.1. Disadvantages of Harmonisation.
- The prospect of the faceless world of "Eurobread" and
"Eurobeer" and for which common recipe laws had to be adopted,
is rejected because it limits product differentiation. The
pursuit of local policy objectives should not be needlessly
sacrificed on the altar of market integration.
- Adjustment costs. Harmonisation will entail for once
adjustments costs for those firms and countries where the
current standards and regulations do not correspond to the
newly-adopted common measure. Due to their existence certain
players might struggle hard to maintain the status quo.
- Negotiation costs. The definition of common regulations
and standards often involves protracted negotiations implying
significant costs in terms of specialist man-hours. As the
outcome about the negotiations is uncertain industry might7
adcpt a"wair and GPe" attitude and abstain in the meantime
from developing innovations.
- Half-way houses. If total harmonisation cannot be agreed
upon, half-hearted and incomplete measures may be adopted.
3.2. EC strategy for elimination of technical barriers.
The EC strategy for removing technical barriers is almost
exclusively oriented towards removing technical barriers
caused by product regulations. Only since 1989, attention has
been devoted to technical barriers related to testing and
certification of harmonised measures. Technical barriers
caused by voluntary industry standards and voluntary
conformity assessment associated with these standards are much
more difficult to tackle. In fact there is no EC policy in
this field; there is a prívate system.
The EC policy for tackling technical barriers in the form
of product requlations encompasses a combination of law and
policy:
- The legal regime based on Article 30 and 36 of the Treaty
and the rulings of the European Court of Justice, which have
given birth to the principle of "mutual recognition".
According to this principle, developed in the Cassis de Dijon
judgment of 20 February 1979, the right of access to the
market is automatically granted to imports which conform to
laws applied in a partner country because if a product is
lawfully manufactured and marketed in one Member State,there
ïs no reason why it should not be sold freely throughout the
EC.
- The policy regime. National disparities in regulations
will be removed with a harmonisation directive on the basis of
Article 100 and after 1 July 1987 on the basis of Article
100A. Harmonisation has taken two different forms over time:
from the old approach to the new approach. Diagram 2.1
illustrates the relationship between the legal and policy
regimes and highlights the building-blocks of the EC policy.
3.3. The legal regime.
The basic article to cover all cost-increasing barriers
to trade is Article 30, stating that:
"Quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent
effect shall ..... be prohibited between Member States."
The problem was that the Treaty did not define the concept of
measures of equivalent effect. The Commission tried to do so
in Directive 70~50 and declared that only national measures
which blatantly discriminated between domestic output and
imported goods were automatically prohibited by Article 30.
However, that non-discriminatory measures can be clearly8
protectionist has been shown by the French blanket case.l
A fundamental difficulty was that of achieving a balance
between the understandable desire of the Member States to
enforce their legislation on the one hand and the
integrationist demands of the Community on the other hand. It
was not until the judgment of the Court in the Dassonville
case of li July 1974 that the primacy of Community interests
was firmly established in relation to Article 30. In this
ruling the Court adopted a wide-ranging definition of ineasures
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions:
"All trading rules enacted by Member states which are capable
of hindering, directly of indirectly, actually or potentially,
intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having
an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions."
The ruling could not be more unambiguous - all measures
capable of impeding intra-EC trade can be found illegal.
Technical barriers resulting from national product regulations
are a priori forbidden.
However, the Court could not usurp the right of national
governments to introduce product regulations in pursuit of
valid policy objectives. The strategy combining Member States'
right to regulate product specifications with the needs of a
free internal market has been found in the key "Casais de
Dijon" ruling of the Court on 20 Februay 1979:
"Any product lawfully produced and marketed in one Member
State must, in principle, be admitted to the market of any
other Member state."
The philosophy behind the phrase "lawfully produced and
marketed in one of the Member States" is that Member States
have the right to apply their preferred national laws to
imported products, but they should take into account that the
same policy objectives could already have been considered by
the exporting other Member State and any discrepancies that do
exist generally relate to regulatory form. By implication,
goods made according to partner country specificatons probably
already embody adequate protection for domestic policy
1 A French Ministerial Decree of 1968 provided that only
blankets of particular sizes could be sold in France. It was
no accident that the decreed sizes were those already applied
by French producers. This meant that blanket manufacturers in
other Member States were obliged to stop exporting to France
or to have a special production for the French market with all
the resulting expense, whereas French manufacturers continued
to produce as before. The French Government was unable to show
that the measure was justified on any grounds known to
Community law, since its object was clearly to protect French
manufacturers. The French authorities therefore bowed to
pressure from the Commission and repealed the Decree.9
:-;torest~ s~ that Member States should not demand conformity
with domestic rules as a condition of entry to the national
market. Such a step would be superfluous and would
unjustifiably damage the competitiveness of imports.
Therefore, the principle of mutual recognition applies
whenever the regulations in the two countries can be
considered equivalent. The mere enunciation of mutual
recognition eliminates countless technical barriers, without
the need for harmonising measures. Products need no longer be
adapted to satisfy rules applied in the country of
destination. Instead, it will be sufficient to display proof
that the good fulfils the regulations applied in the country
of origine. Only one set of regulations needs to be satisfied
for a good to be marketed throughout the EC.
Individual firms, the Commission and Member States are
entitled to challenge before the Court or national judicial
bodies the legality of national regulations which create
obstacles to trade. The ability to enforce this principle in a
court of law is the crucial stick which can be used to beat
recalcitrant countries.
It is worth pointing out that imports from third
countries benefit in equal measure from mutual recognition. A
third country product will be entitled to unhindered
circulation throughout the EC once it complies with the
regulations of any one of the Member States. Therefore, mutual
recognition implies a cost-free gain for foreign producers by
reducing the variety of technical specifications they have to
meet when exporting to the EC.
There is an additional although less obvious advantage of
mutual recognition arising from a process of competition
between rules. Firms will exploit cost differences linked to
regulation by migrating to the most favourable location, or
will have their profits squeezed if they stay put. This
process of arbitrage will clearly reveal which national
regulatory system is the best, so that there will be pressure
on authorities to adjust national regulations over time. The
consequence of this process is that there might be no need any
longer to define harmonised regulations. Ex-ante harmonisation
is not required and can be delegated to a competitive process.
Harmonisation will occur over time ex post.
3.4. Limits to mutual recognition.
Although a country could recognise a partner country's
regulation as equivalent, it could refuse to accept test
results carried out in the exporting country, e.g. because of
lack of faith in the competence of testing bodies in partner
countries. In other words, mutual recognition of product
regulations does not necessarily imply mutual recoqnition of
conformity asaessment and does not automatically guarantee
access to the market.10
Mutual recognition can be suspended whenever partner
country rules do not offer equivalent protection for public
policy interests. Firstly, when it is necessary to protect
certain public policy interests a country may insist that
partner country products conform to local product regulations.
This right is enshrined in Article 36 of the Treaty and in the
"rule of reason" formulated by the Court.Z
Article 36 allows a Member State to apply measures having
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions in order to
safeguard a specified list list of policy objectives, subject
to the condition that those restrictions are not to be abused
for protectionist purposes. In extreme cases, even overt
discrimination between domestic products and imports is
allowed if this is necessary for the protection of the public
interest.
Secondly, under the rule of reason the Court has
recognised that where the EC has not yet adopted harmonising
legislation, Member States are permitted to apply national
rules to imports even if this gives rise to trade barriers,
whenever this is necessary to protect a non-exhaustive list of
policy objectives. In the Cassis de Dijon judgment four such
purposes of general interest have been mentioned: to ensure
the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, to protect public
health, to guarantee the fairness of commercial transactions
and consumer protection. This list has been augmented by the
inclusion of environmental protection. The openendedness of
the rule of reason contrasts with the closed list of policy
objectives laid down in Article 36.
Although these exceptions to mutual recognition safeguard
the right of Member States to pursue legitimate policy
interests, even at the expense of intra-EC trade, in the
course of the jurisprudence three criteria emerged to evaluate
the justification of the condition of necessity:
1) causality: There must exist a direct cause and effect
relation between the trade restrictive measure and the
objective being pursued. E.g., the consumer was not protected
by the Past Purity Law and the consumption of mixed pasta did
not pose a health risk. Therefore, the imposition of domestic
product regulation on imports must contribute directly to the
2 Article 36 reads as follows: "The provisions of article
30 and 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of
public morality, public policy, or public security, the
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants;
the protection of national treasures possessing artistic,
historic or archaeological value; or the protection of
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or
restrictions shall not however, constitute a means of
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
between member states."11
accomnlishment of the policy objective.
2) Proportionality: The application of the national product
regulation should not be more trade-restrictive than is
necessary to protect the policy objective and ought to be
proportional to the objective. E.g., the Pasta Purity Law
effectively prohibited all imports of mixed pasta and such a
strong measure was not necessary.
3) Substitution. If another means exists to obtain the
objective that does not hamper trade, then the policy-maker
should select the least-trade restrictive one. E.g., to the
extent that consumers needed to be protected from mixed pasta,
this could be accomplished through a labelling requirement.
The conclusion is that the principle of mutual
recognition does not imply that there is no room for a
national policy in the internal market. The principle of
mutual recognition can be suspended in the case of an
essential, generally acknowledged threat of health, safety or
the environment in a country. Even if a product is lawfully
produced and marketed in a Member State, it may not be sold
within another Member State which has higher standards of
protection of health, safety and the environment than the
Member State of production, provided always that those higher
standards are justified as being necessary to satisfy these
mandatory requirements.
Although the Cassis de Dijon judgment exhorts the
national authorities to respect the essential equivalence in
the objectives of regulations throughout the Community, the
principle of mutual recognition may have detrimental
consequences for the creation of the internal market. In case
there is no common regulation, the permission to import is
dependent on national authorities, leaving importers uncertain
about how product regulations, which are adhered to in
production, will be viewed by other states. However bona fide
the application of the rules of mutual recognition at the
national level may be, the lack of predictability may dissuade
trans-frontier expansion of trade, impeding the practical
unification of the market. Due to the uncertainty created, the
Cassis de Dijon judgment may provide "a glimpse of such
potential chaos that the fundamental necesssity for speeding
up harmonisation would be appreciated". (Currall, p. 185).
Uncertainty in the law is a serious handicap for traders.
Importers desire a set of rules which make it clear what they
can do; they do not wish to be forced to go to law to
challenge rules telling them what they cannot do. Moreover, as
the European Court has admitted, the national courts retain
competence to determine whether the standards of the exporting
state are equivalent to those in the importing state. This is
not a task the judge can be expected to be well equipped to
fulfill. Much will turn on the quality of expert evidence and
the litigation could be lengthy. This will also carry with it
the risk of different views being taken of the same standards
in different Member States, or in different courts in the same12
Member State. The result is fragmentation of the internal
market. The only solution is harmonisation.
The idea of the mutual acceptance of goods has been
criticised as leading to falling standards and eventually to a
lowest-common denominator. The Cassis de Dijon ruling has been
seen as only one step away from the faceless world of Euro-
bread, Euro-beer and Euro-toys. Consumer organisations were
concerned that the Cassis de Dijon judgment might result in
less stringent health and safety standards and products of
inferior quality. This criticism is less than entirely
justified. Local specialities from every Member State can in
principle be bought and sold in their traditional form all
over the Community. This gives the consumer a wide range of
products to choose from. The internal market will not become a
melting pot in which national or regional specialities will
disappear.
Although it is clear, that it is the free movement of
goods which is the paramount principle and that any
derogations from it must be strictly justified, a large number
of technical barriers slip through this loophole. Under the
exceptions of Article 36 and the rule of reason technical
barriers continue to disrupt intra-EC trade. Provisional
estimates (US ITC 1990) suggest that after Cassis de Dijon 10-
15 per cent of intra-Ec trade is subject to technical trade
barriers. These barriers will persist as long as Member States
can claim that their policy objectives are not protected by
partner country regulations.
3.5. The policy regime: the EC harmonisation policy.
The only way through which obstacles to interstate trade
arising from disparities between national product regulations,
which are acceptable under Article 36 or the rule of reason,
can be removed is via harmonisation directives under Article
100 of the EEC treaty. Then, by definition, all EC products
will embody equivalent levels of protection for commonly held
policy objectives.
Therefore, while the principle of mutual recognition
should be applied where possible, harmonisation must be used
where necessary.
Once Member States adopt implementing measures
transposing the EC directive into national law, technical
barriers will vanish.
3.5.1. The old approach to technical harmonisation.
In the 1960s and the 1970s initially a maximalistic form
of harmonisation was pursued which was designed to replace the
detail contained in the original national regulations. The old
approach to harmonisation was embodied in the "General
Programme for the elimination of technical barriers to trade
caused by disparities among national legislation" adopted by13
the Council on 28 May 1969 and supplemented a few times in
1973 and 1974. The strategy was one oT totai harmonisazi~n
whereby the EC adopted legislation which permitted only goods
complying with the directive to be freely imported and
marketed (the free movement clause) and which prohibited the
sale of goods not complying with the directive (the
exclusivity clause). Even products not leaving the national
borders had to comply with the criteria of the directive.
Until the entry into force of the Single European Act on
1 July 1987, there was the need for unanimity in the Council
of Ministers, so that countries could torpedo any harmonising
directive they did not like. The subsequent search for
acceptable compromises led to a watering down of proposals and
a movement away from total harmonisation. Therefore optional
harmonisation became an attractive alternative, such as in
automobiles. Alongside the common set of technical
specifications laid down in the EC directive, domestic
producers were granted the option of retaining the national
provisions when producing for the domestic market. Only goods
manufactured according to the approximated specifications had
to be freely imported and marketed.
3.5.2. Shortcomings of the old approach, 1969-1984.
The approach of total harmonisation did not necessarily
tackle the technical barriers that did most damage to intra-EC
trade. Much energy was devoted to adopting common recipe laws
for "Eurosausage" and "Eurobread", which attracted the
derision of the popular press. This programme of harmonisation
proved much too ambitious. Only a limited number of directives
have been adopted. From 1968 up to 1985 the Council adopted
some 177 directives, on average only a little less than 10
directives a year. Such a slow speed could not actually bring
about a net reduction in the technical barriers in view of the
simultaneous accretion of new national provisions.
The inadequacies of the old approach became embarassingly
evident over the decade and a half during which the General
Programme was pursued. The shortcomings of the old approach
may be categorised as follows:
1. Time-consuminq and cumbersome procedures.
Due to the elaborate detailed technical descriptions and to
extensive technical consultations, the commission neaucu
much time to prepare a directive. Furthermore, the Council
needed mostly 2 or 3 years to reach a decision,
occasionally rising to 7 years. Implementation periods were
seldom shorter than 1 1~2 year, but mostly increasing to 3
years. Moreover, sometimes differentiation between Member
States with respect to incorporaton into national
legislation was allowed.
2. Unanimity.
The need for a unanimous Council decision on a proposal for
harmonising legislation allowed individual Member states to14
block a measure. The rate of adoption of EC legislation was
slowed down by the need to hammer out acceptable
compromises. A great concern was the great number of
harmonisation dossiers which were put aside because of
disagreement within the Council.
3. Excessive uniformity.
The need for a single set of product specifications
imposed by total harmonisation under the old approach
clashed with the desire for some product flexibility to
accomodate regional and national considerations, e.g.,
tractors for mountain farmers face other requirements than
tractors for farmers in flat countries. Moreover, product
and process innovation by firms may be throttled.
4. Neqlect of European standardisation work.
Independently of the Commission, voluntary European
standards bodies were engaged in the task of producing
European-wide (including EFTA) product specifications.
Unlike the Commission, these bodies were specialist
institutions which could draw upon the expertise of the
national standards bodies when carrying out their technical
work. The Commission could have saved much time and energy
if the technical output of these bodies would have been
incorporated into the proposals for harmonising
legislation. Howevern the EC failed to take on board the
activities of these organisations. The field of the Low
Voltage Directive is the exception where use has been made
of the method of reference to standards set up by CENELEC.
5. New national provisions overwhelm EC leqislatioa.
Although the General Programme did include a weak agreement
for a temporary embargo on new national measures in areas
where EC legislation was planned, further technical
barriers were created by the introduction of new
national regulations on matters outside the limited ambit
of the Programme. Member States were inaccurate and
sluggish in providing information on new national
provisions in areas covered by the Programme. The result
was that even as EC legislation did succeed in tearing down
one technical barrier, ten new technical barriers sprung up
elsewhere.
6. Neqlect of attention to certification and testinq.
Initially it was believed that conformity assessment
barriers could be avoided by including a clause in each
harmonising directive inviting Member States to accept
partner country tests and national approvals. However,
unfortunately enough, Member States did not respond to
these exhortations. There was not yet a common system for
the mutual recognition of certificates so that Member
States were free to apply their own certification
procedures to imports.
7. Incapacity to solve the third country problem.
No attention was paid to the difficulties faced by third15
country producers and their interests were never
considered. The Member States even opposed the progress
toward European standardisation in order to avoid that
third countries exploited their advantages of economies of
scale, with the result that this did not decrease the cost
of the fragmented markets due to different national
standards and regulations. This argument has played an
important role in the automobile sector.
8. Implementation problems in the Member States.
Delays or outright failure to transpose EC directives into
national legislation and discrepancies between any national
implementing measures meant that technical barriers
survived the adoption of EC legislation.
9. Lack of political interest on the part of the politicians.
Old approach harmonisation was an unglamorous and
unrewarding drudgery. National politicians suffered from
low motivation and limited attention when it came to
dealing with technical harmonisation. Therefore, technical
harmonisation did not acquire political momentum despite
its crucial importance for the common market.
The verdict on the old approach to technical
harmonisation is that it was ill-conceived and incapable of
dealing with the problem of technical barriers. Both the
strategy of total harmonisation and the requirement of
unanimity (Article l00) were defective. Therefore, technical
harmonisation in the 1970s and early 1980s can be compared
with hunting for an elephant with a pea-shooter. Zt became
obvious that the ambitious objectives of the 1992 programme
would never be fulfilled without a new policy for technical
harmonisation.
3.5.3. The prevention of new technical barriers to trade.
A critical failure of the old approach was that there was
no mechanism whereby the EC could prevent Member States from
adopting new product regulations which could give rise to
technical trade barriers. On 28 March 1983 the Council adopted
Directive 83~189, called the Information Directive, which
anticipated the new approach and became operational on 1
January 1985. The Directive tackled this problem by imposing
information and notification requirements whenever a Member
State was considering adoption of new technical legislation.
It gives every Member State the option to block the draft
requlation of other Member States for a given period. There is
an automatic standstill period of three months during which
the notifying Member State loses its right to adopt the draft
regulation and during which the Commission and the other
Member States may react. If neither the Commission nor the
Member States react, the Member State can adopt the regulation
at the end of the standstill period. The Commission or the
Member State can react in three ways to avoid potential
barriers to trade:16
a) make comments, which are asked to be taken into account "as
far as possible" when the regulation is finalised.
b) deliver a detailed opinion in order to amend the draft; in
that case suspension of adoption of the national draft for six
months is required.
c) the Commission may, if it considers that common meassures
would be in the Community's interest, announce its intention
to propose a Directive on the matter, in which case the
notified measure may not be adopted for a year after
notification.
There is a procedure for urgent national adoption of
national regulations before consultation, provided the Member
States state the grounds warranting its use. Only the
Commission assesses these grounds on the basis of objective
facts put forward by the Member states to justify an imminent,
serious and unforeseeable risk to safety, health or the
environment.
A parallel procedure was instituted for draft standards
under preparation in the national standards bodies. While for
draft technical regulations the Commisssion is the cornerstone
of the procedure, for standards the notification has to be
made to the European Standardisation Bodies, which circulate
this information to the national standardisation institutions.
Any of these organisations may request to be directly
associated with a notified activity or may request that the
activity takes place at European rather than national level.
On 22 March 1988 by means of Directive 88~182 the scope
of products (originally industrial products) has been extended
to agricultural, medical, pharmaceutical and cosmetic
products. On 1 November 1990, the utility of the procedure has
been further increased by the link-up with the information
system of the EFTA institutions.
As far as technical regulations are concerned, the
effects of Directive 83~189 are encouraging. The total number
of notifications received by the Commission during 1990 and
1991 (821) is 70~ higher than the total over 1988 and 1989.
The interpreation of the concept of technical specification
has caused problems, such as in the case of the fiscal
stimulation measures for clean cars. As soon as these
influence the behaviour of economic subjects on the market
they must be considered de facto as specifications and must be
notified. Increasing use is being made by the Member States
and the Commission of their possibilities to submit comments
and detailed opinions. About half of the detailed opinions
made by the Commission to limit serious difficulties for
intra-Community trade arose from a misunderstanding of the
principle of mutual recognition of equivalent technical
specifications. A third of the detailed opinions concerned the
violation of the principle of non-repetition of equivalent
tests and checks already carried out in another Member State.
This shows that Member States' translation into legislative
terms of the principle of mutual recognition is not yet as17
systematic as might be wished. A second point of concern is
that the announcement of future Community work on technical
regulations seems to encourage Member States into increasing
the tempo of work on national regulations rather than
restricting it. These findings suggest that the concept of
"Community dimension" has not yet sufficiently penetrated
national administrations and that there is a deeply ingrained
preference for national over Community technical regulations.
In the field of standards, analysis of the notifications
reveals both positive and negative aspects. On the positive
side, there is a considerable relative growth in European
activities during the period 1988-1991 from 20~ to 60~ and a
general relative reduction of national activities, from 60g to
20. The total number of new activities increased from 3514 in
1988 to 10210 in 1991. The number of new international
activities remained constant at 20~. About one third of the
new nationál standardisation activities takes place in France.
The number of activities of Germany and the United Kingdom
decreases, while that of Italy and Spain increases again. On
the negative side, there is a lack of commitment making the
information proceduce operate more efficiently. This appears
from the mediocre quality of the information supplied; the
lack of reaction to most national notifications; the absence
of any systematic monitoring of compliance with the status quo
obligation of the "Vilamoura" procedure implemented by CENELEC
in May 1988. This procedure provides for an automatic three-
months status quo period in the event that another institution
requests involvement in the project notified. The Commission
is in favour of introducing a compulsory "status quo" system
for every new activity pending the reactions of other
countries. Finally, national standards institutions are taking
too little advantage of the procedure to propose that European
standards be drawn up on subjects on which national
standardisation work is in progress. Therefore, more use could
be made of the possibility inherent in the information
procedure for the technical integration of the Community.
On 27 November 1992 the Commission submitted a proposal
to amend the Information Directive in order to guarantee the
effective operation of the Internal Market from 1 January 1993
and not so much the creation of that market as was the aim in
1983.
The aim of the amendment is to enlarge the transparency
of actions on national level relating to the obligations of
governmental entities, to increase knowledge of the Directive
among the business community, to make more flexible the
notification procedures, to specify more precisely the right
to participate actively or passively in the standardisation
activities of other Member States, to ensure that product
specifications relate to the entire life cycle of products, to
replace confidentiality as a rule by confidentiality as an
exception, to strengthen the conditions for action on
Community level e.g. in the form of a lengthening of the
period of status quo to 18 months (instead of 12 months).18
3.5.4. The New Approach: reference to European standards,
1985 - .
The new approach deals with the question how
harmonisation can be achieved and how the shortcomings of the
old approach can be avoided.
On 7 May 1985 the Council adopted a resolution on a"New
Approach" to technical harmonisation and standards, which is
based on the principle of subsidiarity, according to which the
right level of government is the lowest level at which the
function in question can be efficiently executed. Higher
levels of government should only exert functions that cannot
be efficiently performed at lower levels. In this sense the
Community should only do what it can do better than the
nations. According to this principle, the economic regulation
should take place from below in the diversity of the Member
States, which is taken over from above by the Community
whenever the functioning of the internal market this requires.
The new approach has an explicit deregulatory bias. The
aim is to limit legislative harmonisation at the EC level to
the establishment of essential requirements of health, safety
and the environment, while the European standardisation bodies
such as CEN, CENELEC and ETSI, which receive standardisation
mandates from the Commisssion for harmonised European
standards, fill in the detailed technical specifications. This
resulting division of labour lies at the heart of the new
approach and is in line with the principle of subsidiarity
which separates the responsibilities between the public and
the private sector.
The technical specifications of the European
standardisation bodies are not mandatory and thus remain
voluntary. This means that a manufacturer may choose not to
manufacture products conforming to standards, but in that case
the onus is on him to show that they do conform to the
essential requirements of the directives. The national
governments are obliged to presume that products manufactured
in conformity with harmonised standards comply with the
essential requirements. It is this presumption that guarantees
automatic access to the markets of all Member States. Member
States cannot exclude products certified as being in
accordance with European standards from their marketplace, nor
can they impose additional conformity assessment tests.
The new approach holds out a number of advantages. It
should increase the speed of reduction of technical barriers.
- Counterproductive disputes within the Council on
technical details will be avoided. It should prove easier to
reach agreement between the Member States with respect to the
essential requirements, thereby facilitating the adoption of
EC legislation. The disappearance of mind-numbing technical
details from Council discussions may stimulate greater19
interest on the part of the national politicians involved.
- The Commission will be relieved from the burden of
drawing up detailed technical specifications, which it is
unqualified to carry out. It allows the Commission to delegate
to standardisation organs what the Commission is illequiped to
do and what the standardisation bodies presumably do well:
specify technical standards on the basis of the reference to
standards approach.
- The focus on basic regulatory requirements means that the
legislation can apply to broader product categories, so that
the new approach can have a sweeping effect. E.g., the Machine
Safety directice (89~392) spans 55000 types of industrial
machines.
- The new approach avoids the need for total harmonisation
of product specifications. The flexibility of the reference to
standards approach prevents one of the fundamental weaknesses
of the old approach: the fixation on total uniformity.
- It limits the contents of the directives to the
specification of the minimum essential requirements for
protecting health, safety and the environment. Producers no
longer find themselves in a legal strait-jacket with respect
to product design. They can now modify products to reflect
innovative breakthroughs or market preferences. However,
refusal to use a European Standard may create practical
difficulties when a producer tries to export. Notably, the
product may have to be retested before it is admitted to the
territory of another country. This danger will be reduced if
the Community develops adequate structures to harmonise
conformity assessment.





1. Simple Pressure Vessels (87~404)
2. Simple Pressure Vessels (Amendment
allowing a transitional period)







4. Machinery (89~392) 14.06.89 31.12.92
5. Machniery amandment to cover mobile
machinery and lifting equipment 21.06.91 31.12.92
6. Electromagnetic compatibility (89~336) 03.05.89 01.01.92
7. Non-automatic weighing instruments
(90~384) 20.06.90 01.01.9320
8. Implantable Medical Equipment (90~385) 20.06.90 01.01.93
9. Medical Devices: Proposal COM(91)287 23.08.91 ---
lO.Gas-burning appliances (90~396) 29.06.90 01.01.92
11.Personal protective equipment (89~686) 21.12.89 01.07.92
12.Telecommunications equipment 29.04.91 06.11.92
13.Lifts (90~486) 17.09.90 24.03.91
14.Construction Products (89~106) 21.12.88 27.06.91
15.Equipment and systems for potentially
explosive atmospheres:
Proposal COM(91)516 20.02.92 ---
3.5.5. The global approach to testing and certification.
A conspicuous defect of the new approach was the careless
attitude taken with respect to conformity assessment
procedures. In the new approach it was simply foreseen that
each directive would mention the procedures to assess
conformity with the essential requirements. However, in
practice there was a widespread reluctance to accept test
results and certificates issued in a partner country,
attributable to a lack of confidence in partner country
conformity assessment. This has created technical barriers to
trade.
The principal obstacles standing in the way of a common
solution are unfamiliarity with and mistrust of partner
country standards and standardisation bodies. Standards bodies
may have doubts both about the soundness of partner country
standards and the professionalism of partner country testing
and certification bodies.
In order to limit the potential for technical barriers
caused by conformity assessment, these activities should be
organised in accordance with common principles and criteria by
providing clear and objective means of assessing the
competence and responsibilities of testing, certification and
inspection bodies. Once testing and certification results
issued in one country are acceptable throughout the Community,
the use of an EN no longer implies a presumption of conformity
headstart over alternative standards.
To this end on 24 July 1989 the Commission transmitted to
the Council a comprehensive Communication relating to a
"Global Approach to Testing and Certification" which formed
the basis for a Council Resolution on this subject on 21
December 1989.
The measures necessary for the implementation of the
global approach relate to four levels of action.
a). Action on the basic structures.
It is the aim to make the structures for the evaluation
of conformity, i.e. the bodies responsible for certification
and inspection of the testing laboratories and the21
manufacturers' quality systems, as homogeneous, transparent
and credible as possible throughout the Community. There is a
presumption of conformity for certification bodies and
accredited laboratories who apply the EN 45000 series
standards and for manufacturers who apply the EN 29000 series
of standards governing the management of quality assurance. If
these criteria for evaluating the competence of operators in
the field of conformity assessment are met, there are no
longer technical barriers to trade.
b). Action on regulations.
In the global approach the Commission presented the
"modular" approach which gives manufacturers a choice among
several methods (or modules) for demonstrating product
conformity to the essential requirements of the new approach
directives. In each directive the choice of conformity
assessment procedures will depend on:
- the desired level of safety;
- the type of risk and the sensitivity of consumers and
users to the risk which a product may present; e.g.
sterile products may require different solutions from
those for simple pressure vessels;
- the infrastructure of the sector; e.g. it might be
inappropriate to choose third party intervention on
products in an area where appropriate bodies do not
exist.
- the characteristics of the products; e.g. some products
using advanced technology lend themselves less well to
tests on the finished product; e.g. in the case of
data processing equipment or sterile products one can
apply methods of quality assurance.
- the rate of production of a product; e.g. it is not
necessarily practicable to impose assessment methods
adapted to mass production when a large proportion of the
production is based on small series. Nor is it
practicable to provide for verification of individual
units when the product is mass-produced.
Each module for conformity assessment differs from others
with respect to the stage of development of the product ( e.g.
design, prototype, full production), the types of assessment
involved, (e.g. documentary checks, type-testing, quality
assurance, inspection) and the body responsible for testing
(the manufacturer or various third parties).
In each directive the conformity assessment module to be
applied will be earmarked. As a general rule a product should
undergo a control in both the design phase and production
phase before to be placed on the market.
In order to promote the use of European Standards, the
global approach envisages that producers using ENs will
benefit from lighter conformity assessment procedures.
However, for products with special great risks, such as
pacemakers, heavy inspections by third parties are required,22
which are labourintensive, timeconsuming and expensive. If the
manufacturer is not obliged to undergo the prescribed
inspection he may avoid these costs by using a system of
quality management. Although the introduction of such a system
takes much time, in the end it may be worthwhile.
c). The "CE" mark.
The affixing of the single common CE mark on the products
is the tangible sign of their conformity to Community rules.
Every product which satifies the essential requirements will
be entitled to bear this mark. The CE mark is the key, the
passport which will unlock all Member States' markets. It must
be pointed out the the CE marking signals only a product's
presumed legality, i.e. conformity with essential requirements
and as such is intended to satisfy national authorities and
frontier officials. Voluntary certification marks, by
contrast, are directed towards the customer, to siqnify
conformity with a standard the consumer recognizes, certified
by a body the customer recognizes. However, in future,
voluntary national marks will probably lose their reason to
exist if they do not provide a further element of quality.
d). The European Organisation for Testing and Certification.
Originally, market access barriers caused by testing and
certification of industry standards received little attention.
The absence of common rules and procedures for testing and
certification brought about a serious blow to the usefulness
of ENS .
In the past, CEN and CENELC have sporadically tackled
these questions when drawing up ENs. Both organisations have
appointed special advisory committees (the Marks Committee and
the CENCER Committee) to explore possible solutions, such as
the CENELEC Electronic Components certification agreement and
the CENELEC HAR agreement on electrical cables. These
agreements provided for mutual recognition of test results and
certificates, supplemented by common arrangements for marking
in the form of a single mark or a series of national marks.
However, these isolated agreements have not been the catalyst
for a common marking system of showing conformity to ENs. It
was felt that the standardisation bodies themselves were not
well-placed to resolve these problems as they do not count
testing and certification bodies among their members.
In the sphere of testing, certification and inspection
there was an institutional vacuum at the European level. In
order to ensure that this vacuum is filled, the global
approach also proposed a structure for cooperation for testing
and certification in the field of voluntary standards. On 25
April 1990, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the
Commission, EFTA, CEN and CENELEC laying down the objectives
and principles for a new European Organisation for Testing and
Certification (EOTC). The key aim is to remove the need for
multiple checks and tests on products arising from23
requirements set by buyers, users and consumers. This is to be
achieved by mutual acceptance of testing and certification
results across the Europe, or joint certification systems,
based on common criteria to ensure confidence in their
operation.
The EOTC has already identified two priorities for
action:
- The setting up of a European Quality system to harmonise
criteria for the accreditation of testing and
certification bodies.
- The establishment, in cooperation with CEN~CENELEC and
the Commission of a common marking system of conformity
to European Standards.
The EOTC is scheduled to be fully operational by the
beginning of 1993. The adequate functioning of the EOTC should
lead to a situation in which:
- National standards bodies would be willing to endorse
products manufactured according to partner country
standards;
- Proofs of conformity to local or partner country
standards supplied by a partner country institution would
be fully credible.
Conclusions on the global approach.
The global approach is a substantial improvement of the
policy vacuum that existed before. The flexibility offered by
the modular approach is a welcome bonus. However, in certain
cases, the use of particular modules has been criticised as
being inappropriate. For example, in the "Toys Directive" the
decision to rely on manufacturers' self-declaration of
compliance with the essential requirements has been widely
condemned by consumer organisations who claim that health and
safety concerns are not adequately protected. Critics of the
global approach complain that producers are being given too
much leeway at the expense of the ability to monitor
conformity with regulations.
4. Evaluation of the EC strategy to eliminate technical
barriers to trade.
The Community policy for the removal of techical barriers
has not been born yesterday. The policy has evolved in a
piecemeal fashion over a number of years, has progressed in
leaps, moving ahead whenever it became clear that less than
radical solutions would be inadequate. In this sense the birth
of mutual recognition, the shift away from total harmonisation
in the old approach towards the new approach, the information
directive and the global approach can be mentioned.
On paper at least the Community seems to have formulated
a policy that is capable of eliminating remaining bariers.
However, in practice the developments have been so radical
that teething troubles are inevitable and that there is still24
some way to go before the problem of technical barriers is
laid to rest. The CEPS report tried to show how complex and
difficult the challenge is the Community has shouldered. It
would be unrealistic to expect these problems to be resolved
overnight.In the report next weaknesses of the new strategy
have been mentioned.
4.1. Mutual recognition.
Although mutual recognition limits at a stroke the need
for harmonisation of national product regulations and opens
the way for intra-ec trade, it has not always been respected
in practice.
Frequently, national administrations insist that partner
country imports have to comply with national regulations even
though the exceptions of article 36, the mandatory
requirements of Cassis de Dijon or the rule of reason are not
at stake. Athough evidence on the abuse of mutual recognition
is sketchy and is often anecdotal, certains indications
suggest that national administrations do not have a proper
grasp on the principle:
- Within the framework of the information directive the
Commission has observed that many draft technical regulations
make the importation of products subject to compliance
exclusively with national standards or technical
specifications, disregarding production conditions in another
Member State which provide an equivalent level of protection
of health and safety.
- In 1990 and 1991, firms have notified to the Commission
399 respectively 346 cases of infringements of mutual
recognition, while the Commission services have identified
another 82 cases, respectively 93.
This tentative evidence suggests that mutual recognition
is widely flouted. Unfortunately, it is difficult to enforce
this commandment. As yet, there is no means of monitoring the
day-to-day application of EC law on the free movement of goods
by national customs administrations. In cases, where national
authorities act in breach of mutual recognition, it is up to
the aggrieved firm to challenge the decision. This assumes
that the firm is knowledgeable about its rights under EC law
and that it has the means and the resolve to contest the
decision. It is doubtful whether these conditions are often
met in practice. However, the EC has launched a number of
initiatives to educate and inform national civil servants and
firms about EC law and internal market legislation. As part of
this campaign, the ec has established databases to provide
firms with up-to-date information on internal market
legislation and is sponsoring exchanges of national customs
officials.
4.2. Old approach.
Although the old approach had great objections, it was
difficult to guarantee that the new approach satisfied the
requirements of health and safety. As producers were allowed25
to choose their own product specif ication, there was the risk
of unsafe products being sold on the market place. In order to
prevent this situation, the Community decided to persevere
with detailed technical harmonisation along the lines of the
old approach in the fields of foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals and
chemical products. In these areas resort to total
harmonisation is required because Member States are anxious to
impose strict control on the production and marketing of these
products. In other fields such as automobiles, the decision to
persist with the old approach seems to have been determined by
more pragmatic factors, in this sense that certain countries
found it convenient that during prolonged harmonisation
discussions on detailed technical matters their manufacturers
were protected by technical barriers from third country
imports. However, in the Internal Market Council held on 31
March 1992, the Ministers took a final decisive step towards
their common position on Community approval of private cars to
become a compulsory reality on 1 January 1998. To this end, on
31 March 1992, the last specific directives on mass and size,
windows and tires have been adopted.
Although the old approach was inefficient to tackle the
problem of technical barriers, the adoption of old approach
measures has proceeded smoothly. Therefore, the old approach
should not be written off as a total failure. The adoptíon of
large numbers of old approach legislation constitutes even one
of the success stories of the Internal Market programme. This
can be attributed to the introduction of qualified majority
under Article 100 A of the Single European Act. However,
problems have become manifest in foodstuffs, chemicals and
pharmaceuticals.
- In foodstuffs, further technical work is necessary to
give follow-up and effect to framework directives in the form
of implementing legislation. (Here, 50 vertical measures are
needed on additives.) Occasionally, these specific measures
have called forth disputes as was the case with the propos3l
for a Directive on Sweeteners destined for use in foodstuffs.
3 However, on 7 November 1991 the Ministers reached an
agreement which, while safeguarding the principle of the
freedoms of establishment and movement of goods, made it
possible for Germany to prohibit the manufacturing of some
sweetened beers on its territory, which would be in
contradiction to the law on the purity of beer dating from the
16th century. The demands of other Member States concerning a
protection of the same nature for their traditional
productions were also fulfilled. More concretely, a Member
State may prohibit the use of sweeteners for alcohol-free
beers or for beers with an alcohol content not exceeding 1.2
per cent vol., which are brewed in accordance with a national
traditional process and are manufactured on its territory.
Thus, for example, a Belgian brewery could not produce these
types of beer by sweetening them on German territory; in
contrast, Belgium could export to Germany these types of beer
which will have been sweetened outside of Germany, but these26
- In chemicals, in the light of technical progress,
harmonising legislation may need to be continually updated.
- In pharmaceuticals, national price controls and
reimbursement systems will continue to form distortions as
long as there is discrimination in favour of national
products.
4.3. The new approach.
The new approach may, in principle, be applied in all
sectors or areas not covered by old approach legislation. New
approach measures are introduced to succeed obsolete or
unsatisfactory old approach legislation, such as the proposed
Directive on Equipment and Protective Systems for Use in
Potentially Explosive Atmospheres. Therefore, new approach
measures adopted to date or currently under discussion
represent only the forefront of the new approach.
Although the Commission will continue to identify further
areas where new approach legislation is needed, it is unclear
how the Commission determines priority areas for the
application of the new approach. There is no definitive list
of new approach measures needed to complete the Internal
Market.
The proposed measures do not always seem to focus on
areas where harmonising legislation can have a real impact.
E.G. the Construction Products Directive has been criticised
as ill-conceived. The low levels of intra-EC trade in
construction products are largely explained by structural
factors, such as high transportation costs and the preference
of craftsmen for local products. Although technical barriers
are present in this sector, it is unlikely that harmonising
legislation will lead to any significant improvement in market
integration.
Although the reference to standards approach avoids many
of the shortcomings of the old approach, the new approach is
not without its own weaknesses.
While the new approach legislation is attractive from the
point of view of the legislator, it is not always user-
friendly. The manufacturer is interested in knowing how the
essential requirements may be translated into useable
production technologies. If precise technical guidelines are
not provided, manufacturers themselves will have to incur the
costs of developing products which meet the essential
requirements. However, the wording of the essential
requirements is often so general that it does not provide
clear directions for further technical work within the
European Standardisation Bodies. E.g., in the Construction
beers exported to Germany must indicate their sweetening on
the label. (Europe, 9 November 1991.)Products Directive, the Commission has been obliged to draw up
"interpretation documents" which provide preliminary technical
guidelines for the European Standardisation bodies. The net
result is that the Commission has been unable to delegate all
the technical work to the standards organisations. The
division of labour between the policy institutions and the
specialist technical organisations is vague. Delays in
providing the interpretation documents has held up
standardisation work in the construction products sector.
The Council and the Commission have cleared their decks
at the expense of the European Standards Bodies, i.e., there
is a tendency to pass the buck from the legislator to the
standards makers. It has become apparent that the result of
this action has been to merely shift the bottleneck to the
removal of technical barriers from the governmental to the
private sector. These organisations are now entrusted with the
task of mass-producing high-quality ENs needed for the
internal market. Although reformed working practices and
organisational improvements have enabled these bodies to
deliver increasing numbers of ENs, there is a growing fear
that sufficient numbers of ENs will not be available to allow
EC harmonising legislation to become operational within the
envisaged deadlines. In the absence of ENs, producers will be
unable to benefit from a presumption of conformity with the
essential requirements. For the time being, therefore, their
products will have to satisfy tests for conformity of each
Member State. In order to avoid this type of situation, the
Commission has advocated a radical restructuring of the
European Standards Bodies in the Green Paper on European
Standardisation (to be discussed underneath).
4.4. The CE mark.
The CE mark signals that products have satisfied rigorous
tests for conformity to essential requirements. The CE mark is
intended to help inspectors to distinguish products which need
further testing from those which do not. Products which have
already been found to comply with EC legislation will be freed
from further conformity assessment. Products from outside the
Community are not allowed to be imported and marketed without
the CE mark.
However, the initial attempts to introduce a CE mark were
badly put together. From the outset, there was no clear set of
principles as to how and under what conditions the CE mark
should be applied. In order to avoid confusion, on 5 June
1991, the Commission has come forward with a proposal for a
regulation clarifying the conditions under which the CE mark
can be affixed to a product. Its main provisions are the
following:
- The CE mark would be nothing more and nothing less than a
guarantee that a product fulfils essential requirements, so
that it can be sold on all EC markets without further
hindrance.
- The CE mark should no longer be voluntary. Producers are28
obliged to affix it to all products which conform to essential
requirements.
- National marks indicating conformity with national
legislation would lose all relevance. In future, the CE mark
would be the only valid mark of conformity.
- If a product is covered by several directives, the fixing
of the CE mark would indicate conformity with all legislative
requirements.
- The CE mark is not intended to be a badge of quality or
environmental soundness. Producers may therefore wish to
acquire further quality marks by conforming to voluntary
standards.
This proposal has met some criticism. The proposed
regulation neglects the crucial question of enforcement. It
makes no provision for tracing and punishing abuses of the CE
mark. There is the danger that product safety inspectors will
waive conformity assessment tests on goods carrying already
the CE mark. As producers may choose their own product
specifications and as manufacturers themselves may be
entrusted with the task of ensuring conformity, (sometimes
referred to as Manufacturers Self-Declaration) it is possible
that unsafe products, unwittingly or knowingly, stamped with
the CE mark, might be marketed throughout the Community
without ever being subjected to proper conformity assessment.
Under these conditions, all products, both legal and illegal
would carry the CE mark as a matter of course. Therefore, the
CE mark offers no fool-proof guarantee that the product is
safe to use and inspectors will need to be equally vigilant
when examining CE stamped goods.
The only way the CE mark could retain any usefulness
would be if its use will be heavily policed. However, onerous
enforcement will impose heavy compliance costs on EC industry.
This legitimate concern should urgently be addressed if
consumer interests are not to be jeopardised by a single
market in dangerous products.
In an attempt to resolve the growing confusion over the
use and meaning of the CE mark and to improve the transparency
of Community law in this respect, the Commission has proposed
to convert its proposed regulation on the CE mark into a
proposed directive. This new directive will amend those
directives already in existence which have diverging
provisions on the CE mark which should be replaced by uniform
provisions, especially if products belong to different
directives. These cover the following 12 subjects: simple
pressure vessels, toys, construction products, electromagnetic
compatibility, machinery, personal protective equipment, non-
automatic weighing equipment, active implantable medical
devices, appliances burning gaseous fuels, telecommunications
terminal equipment, new hot-water boilers fired with liquid or
gaseous fuels, electrical equipment designed for use within
certain voltage limits.
It is anticipated that the directive should come into29
force by January 1, 1995, although products marked in
acccordance with the directives which it amends may continue
to be put on the market until Januray 1997.
The Commission has also brought forward a proposed
decision to amend the 1990 decision on the modules for
assessing conformity in order to add provisions for the
affixing and use of the CE mark.
4.5. European Standardisation.
Within the framework of the new approach, the European
Standardisation Bodies are supposed to deliver large numbers
of ENs needed to translate the abstract essential requirements
into precise technical specifications. However, there are
widespread fears that the ESBs are incapable to doing so
within the required time-frame. Bottlenecks in the European
standardisation process have become a major source of concern
for the EC policy makers.
The main cause of delay is the fact that scarce
resources, i.e. the technical industry experts, are tied up
for too long in small numbers of projects. It takes the ESBs
2-3 years to produce a draft EN, another year to complete a
period of public enquiry and a further six months for the
standard to be transposed into a national standard. And this
is on a good day. On occasion it has taken the ESBs up to 9
years to develop a EN.
Under these conditions, for firms it is difficult to
fulfil essential requirements and for EC legislation to take
effect. Due to the absence of the necessary standards, the Toy
Safety and the Simple Pressure Vessels Directives have been
sidelined. The Machine Safety Directive requires 200-300
European Standards. In order to avoid this problem, more
recent new approach directives incorporate lenthy transitional
periods and explicitly state that national regulations will
continue to apply if ENs are not available when the directive
is scheduled to take effect.
Therefore, the danger is that the liberalisation of
intra-EC trade is interrupted.
The question arises whether these difficulties reflect
inherent weaknesses of the new approach.
Two comments may be provided on this question.
1). The new approach does not provide guidelines to the ESBs
as to how they have to manage transforming the essential
requirements into detailed product specifications. In order to
expedite the preparation of ENs the Commission promised to
prepare "Interpretative Documents" which intend to assist the
ESBs in the preparation of the necessary ENs. However, this
again appears to take a long time, such as in the case of
Construction Products. Therefore, it is intrinsically
difficult to translate new approach legislation into product30
specifications.
2). Delays in producing ENs are partly attributable to poor
management and inefficient working methods within the ESBs.
These problems have been dealt with in the Green Paper on
Standardisation published on 8 October 1990, which aimed at:
- a faster delivery of ENs;
- greater participation of European industry in standard
setting.
These objectives are interlinked in this sense, that it
was hoped that more private-sector resources would be
forthcoming if industry was more actively involved.
Procedural and structural proposals lay at the heart of
the Green Paper. Many of the procedural proposals have been
emdorsed by industry and national standards organisations. The
ESBs themselves have acknowledged that working methods can be
tightened up and they have pledged to improve programming of
activities, to monitor work in progress and to impose
penalties if deadlines are overstepped. However, some of the
proposed procedural reforms have not been so well received. Zn
particular, national standards bodies have underlined the
practical difficulties in making ENs directly effective. It is
claimed that ENs are not well publicised and that their
adoption would pass unnoticed by producers. Therefore,
transposition into a national standard will continue to
increase the profile of the EN and will guarantee its wide
application. Moreover, the desirability of shortening the
public enquiry period, as proposed in the Green Paper, is
questioned, especially for new and unfamiliar ENs. In general,
commentators cautioned against the blind pursuit of faster
delivery of ENs. Efforts to speed up the process should not
clash with the objective of hiqh-quality ENs based on state-
of-the-art technology and consensus among the parties.
With respect to structure, the Green Paper advocated a
far-reaching revision of the institutional framework of
European standardisation:
- More decentralisation through sectoral organisations in
which industry participates directly;
- Coordination through a European Standardisation Board
which is to manage the day-to-day operations and through a
European Standardisation Council, consisting of the social
partners, industry representatives, the Commission and the
EFTA Secretariat for the strategic direction.
The structural elements of the Green Paper have been
roundly attacked:
- Restructuring along sectoral lines would splinter the
European Standardisation system, with problems of effective
coordination and duplication of work and a lack of consistency
between projects.
- Another two layers of bureaucracy would be introduced to
an already over-stretched system.
- Industry is reluctant to commit itself to a bigger role
in European standardisation if its participation carries a31
large price-tag.
Due to the opposition towards the green Paper the
Commission has restrained its proposals. The structural reform
has been shelved and the current setup will remain in place,
although the existing system is to be improved by
institutionalising the Joint Presidents Group to coordinate
the activities of CEN~CENELEC~ETSI.
The Green Paper has been useful in drawing attention to
bottlenecks in the European standardisation process.
The procedural improvements will not drastically increase
the rate of output of the ESBs.
Low levels of resources will continue to form a
bottleneck for the production of ENs, which will continue to
be in short supply, and many new approach directives will be
unable to take effect. Therefore, technical barriers will
remain a feature of the business environment.
4.6. Implementation and transposition into national law.
On 16 March 1992, the Commission had accomplished its
part of the work. It has submitted all the proposals expected
of it on the basis of the White Paper, i.e. 282 proposals.
Out of the 282 measures 95~ have been adopted; the Council
only has 18 decisions left to take. The European Parliament is
not lagging far behind. This shows that the Community's three
main institutions are, on the whole, correctly assuming their
responsibilities in building the Single Market. Despite the
gaps remaining, the legislative framework is essentially in
place.
It is for the Member States to implement Community rules
and to take the necessary transposition measures. Although the
rate of transposition tends to fall whenever new legislation
enters into force, the transposition of Community texts into
national legislation has continued to progress. However, as
long as implementation is uneven within the Community,
application and enforcement of EC legislation means that
consumers are not treated equally throughout the Community. In
May 1993 the transposition average was 84g.





















Sectors in which there are the biggest delays are the
veterinary, insurance and public procurement sectors.
A few causes for the delay in the transposition of the
directives can be mentioned:
- The entities arranging the transposition are not always
the same entitities as those which negotiated for the32
directives and they do not feel tied by the required time
period as long as the Commission does not react. Case studies
performed by EIPA show that a ministry's approach to
implementation of Community law is more positive when they
have taken part in its prepparation. There is no powerful
centralised monitoring structure in the Member States over the
application of the directives.
- For the four relatively decentralised EC countries,
Germany, Belgium, Italy and Spain, participation of, or at the
very least consultation with, the regions is likely to improve
the chances of proper and timely implememtnation.
- When important interest groups have been ignored, they
can form a serious obstacle to implementation, while in
different cicumstances they can be a driving force.
- Interpretation problems in difficult directives, such as
the Product Liability Directive. Here the Commission has
arranged meetings of experts in order to parallel the
transposition in the different Member States.
- Parliamentary procedures have been mentioned as a cause
for delay. However, in fact, most enforceable directives do
not require a parliamentary procedure for transposition in the
Member States, so that this reason is a false excuse. In case
future, directives will more often concern subjects belonging
to the field of the legislator, decisions in the form of
regulations might be the solution of these difficult
questions. Nevertheless, national parliaments show little
interest in implementation and enforcement, but this is a
general problem, irrespective of whether one speaks of
domestic or Community law. However, this contrasts sharply
with the attentive attitude of the European Parliament, which
is a driving force in the implementation debate.
If, given the increasing rate of transposition, merit can
be afforded to Community institutions and certain Member
States, any triumphalism should be avoided. It is a question
of nothing having been won as long as all is not won. Certain
measures "left for the end" involve some of the most difficult
to take. This will be the case for e.g. food. It will be up to
the Council to prove its determination to build the Single
Market.
Although the incorporation of directives into national
law is a necessary condition for the proper application of
common measures, it is not a sufficient condition. There are
two sorts of problems here:
- Application of directives requires adequate executive
measures both at national and EC level. E.g. there must be an
infrastructure of testing and approval which is professional
and which has confidence in the activities of other Member
States institutions in this field.
- The effectivity of directives is to a high degree
determined by the presence of ENs and these are relatively in
short supply.
The crux of 1992 is in the markets. For the adoptions by
the Council to affect profit expectations, economic33
transactions, corporate strategies, consumer choice and
zraàing opporLUnities, they have to be properly implemented
and at the right time. The appropriate criterion to assess
implementation is whether market participants are actually
affected by the liberalistion envisaged and the regulatory
objectives adopted. However, without full implementation
throughout the Community, some trade-restricting national
rules will remain in place. Although the non-implementing
countries can be censured by the Court of Justice, it takes
some time for legal proceedings to be concluded.4 In the
interim, technical barriers would continue to disrupt intra-EC
trade. To avoid this situation the Commission has proposed a
number of remedies, such as the improvement in the
transparency of national implementing measures, so that
pressure can be exerted on the tardy Member States. Databank
CELEX and INFO 92 may prove to be very useful in this respect.
4.7. Sustaining the Internal Market Programme post-1992.
In order for the Internal Market after the adoption of
all regulatory texts to work effectively the Commission set up
in March 1992 a High-Level Group chaired by the former EC
Competition Commissioner, Peter Sutherland, to assess how the
Single Market Programme should be sustained post-1992. On 28
October 1992 the report "The Internal Market after 1992:
Meeting the Challenge" was submitted to the Commission. On 2
December 1992 the Commission adopted as its initial response
to the Sutherland Report a Communication in which it defines
the way it intends managing the Single Market.
The central message of the Sutherland Report is to
underscore the shared responsibility of the Commission and the
Member States in managing the internal market. In the report
there is much emphasis on the need for openness and
subsidiarity in EC policy-making.
The main of the 38 specific recommendations of the report
can be summarized as follows:
- All proposals of legislation must be examined throughly
to compare the advantages and inconveniences of Community
4 The case law of the Court of Justice has established
that Member States are obliged to compensate individuals for
any losses that arise from failure to transpose Directives.
(Francovich S Bonafici vs. Italy, 19 November 1991.) Such
compensation must be paid if three conditions are fulfilled:
- the Directive must involve the granting of rights to private
individuals;
- the provisions of the Directive must enable the
identification of the contents of those rights;
- a causal relationship must exist between the breach of the
Member State's obligations and the damage suffered by the
persons concerned.
This ruling will undoubtedly raise the costs of
infringements for Member States.34
intervention on the basis of the five criteria of need,
effectiveness, proportionality, consistency and communication;
- During the next few years, the Commission should examine
the nature, intensity and importance of direct and indirect
obstacles to the functioning of the Internal Market;
- On behalf of consumers and firms the Commission should
set up a strategy for information on Community legislation;
but it will be up to the Member States in particular to
improve information for consumers and firms;
- Wide and effective consultation on Commission proposals
is essential. The Commission will have to make public as early
as possible all new intentions regarding legislation, make
availbale analyses which serve as reference to these
initiatives, arrange hearings for all those interested;
- The Commission should ensure the transparency of the
entire Community legislative process, involving more sustained
and systematice efforts in codifing Community law;
- Directives should be gradually changed into directly
applicable rules, so as to lead to single texts valid
throughout the Community; meanwhile, the transposition of
directives into national legislations should be better
coordinated to avoid discrepanciès and contradictions;
- The real impact of Community legislation and of the
principle of mutual recognition should be assessed
periodically by the Commission;
- The way the rights of individuals seeking redress for
breaches of Community law are dealt with should be reexamined
and more effort should be made to improve knowledge of
Community law on the part of national judges and lawyers;
- Alleged infringements by authorities in the award of
public contracts need be firmly and rapidly dealt with;
The Communication is based on the observation that the
Community is now embarked on a phase in which its main
function will be to administer the rules it has adopted and to
live up to its responsibility towards consumers, firms and
individuals. The Commission confirms its determination to
assume all its responsibilities and exercise its prerogatives.
It stresses that implementation of Community law will depend
not so much on legislative instruments as on monitoring
arrangements, assessment measures amd direct communication. It
especially emphasises the following key-elements:
- Improvement in the transparency of Community rules and of
their implementation. To this end an annual report on the
internal market will be published.
- Strengthening of the partnership with Member States with
respect to the performance and practical application of
Community obligations.
- Strengthening of control rules, notably in the field of
public procurement, to ensure the correct and consistent
implementation in all the Member States, for which national
courts are primarily responsible.
At the practical level, the Commission sets out from the
principle that the lifting of border controls on goods will be
the imperative rule from 1 January 1993, whether the Community35
provisions have been transposed into national legislation or
~~t
5. Spin-off effects.
Finally a brief look will be provided at the implications
of the efforts to eliminate technical barriers on three
closely-affected policies.
5.1. European Standards and public procurement.
Traditionally, government agencies have tended to buy
locally when awarding contracts for public works and public
supplies. "Reference to national standards" effectively
excluded many partner country firms from competing for
government contracts. As part of its campaign to prise open
these public procurement markets, the Community has sought to
outlaw reference to national standards in government tenders.
An attempt has been made to harmonise throughout Europe the
standards used for contracts.
The directives clearly state the order in which standards
can be used by authorities during the contract process. These
are:
- European standards, or national standards which implement
European standards. These take priority over all other
standards;
- national standards, where no European standard exists;
- any other available standard, where national standards do
not exist.
Exceptions to these rules will be allowed if the
following conditions are met:
- European standards will not be applied if progress has
already been made within the Community, even at sectoral
level, to standardise equipment. The latter applies
particularly in the cases of telecommunications equipment and
information technology;
- new equipment does not need to comply with European
standards if existing equipment is incompatible with EC
standards;
- if the project is so innovative that no standards of any
kind exist.
By outlawing reference to national standards the present
amended Directives on Public Works and Public Supplies as well
as the more recent Utilities Directive, covering the once
excluded sectors of water, transport, energy and
telecommunications, go one step further by requiring all
government tenders to use European Standards as a basis for
contract specifications, in order to allow partner country
producers to compete on an equal footing.
However, this ties the hands of EC producers when
designing products for sale to public agencies and it limits
the freedom of public bodies and suppliers to settle on the36
nest set of technical specifications. Therefore, although
there are escape clauses, the public authorities may be forces
to purchase products which do not match their needs. This
quasi-compulsory status of European standards in public
procurement contrasts with their optional nature under the new
approach where producers retain the freedom to use preferred
technical specifications. This seemed to be the only way of
preventing government agencies from restricting competition
according to the Commission. However, the question is whether
there is no better alternative, e.g. by obliging public
agencies to consider products made to "equivalent" standards?
5.2. Consumer protection policy.
Over the years, the EC consumer protecton policy has
evolved in a piecemeal fashion. This policy includes four main
elements.
a). Preventing unsafe products from reaching the marketplace.
It is sometimes argued that more defective may find their
way onto the market once the new approach takes effect,
arising from the difficulties in enforcing the vague essential
requirements. It is felt that ENs are designed more with an
eye to convenience for producers than to consumer protection.
This criticism is fuelled by the refusal of the ESBs to allow
consumer bodies to participate directly in European
standardisation. So far, participation of consumer
representatives in decision-making on product legislation
takes place through the Consumer's Consultative Council.
Moreover, it is frequently heard that the conformity
assessment procedures are too lenient to detect defective
products. E.g., in the Toys Safety Directive, the manufacturer
ascertains the safety of a product, while rigorous tests by
third parties should be applied, according to these voices.
Furthermore, as a supplementary measure, on 27 April
1989, a General Product Safety Directive has been proposed to
prevent unsafe goods from reaching the marketplace, thereby
closing off any gaps where specific product legislation has
not been adopted. Industry fears that the provisions of every
vertical Directive regulating the details for a specific
sector could be overruled by the application of the broad
provisions of the general Directive, leading to legal
uncertainty and to divergent interpretations of the various
Directives by the national authorities. The Commision would be
empowered to instruct Member States to withdraw defective
products from the market under an EC product emergence
procedure only after one Member State has acted to remove a
good from the market. Work on this proposeal has reached an
advanced stage with the adoption of a common position by the
Council on 15 October 1991.37
b). Redress for damages caused by unsafe products.
The General Product Liability Directive of 25 July 1985
specifies the circumstances under which a manufacturer becomes
liable for damages caused by consumption or use of a product.
The Directive applies a stringent definition of liability: the
onus is on the producer to prove that the product was not
responsible for the alleged damages. The Directive clears the
manufacturer of his liability if he proves that the defect is
due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations
issued by public authorities, i.e. when he has no discretions
whatsoever as to how to produce. However, mostly,
manufacturers have a choice as to the product specification to
be applied. Testing, certification and inspection may diminish
the risks and hence the likelihood of damages, but do not
affect the liability of the manufacturer.
The Directive has been the target of some criticism. In
particular, the directive does not extend to damages in the
commercial sector, and consumer damage is not fully
compensated. Therefore, the Directive may not provide enough
incentive for producers to monitor product safety. More
seriously, most Member States have not introduced implementing
measures to enable the Directive to come into effect. If steps
are not taken to ensure transposition, widely different
approaches to product liability will remain in place.
c). Follow-up market surveillance.
Since March 1985, an information system for the rapid
exchange of information on dangers arising from the use of
consumer products has been in operation, but without common
procedures for the withdrawal of dangerous products from
circulation; national provisions still apply.
Consumer protection policy emerged as a series of
disconnected responses to pressures releashed by market
integration and has been viewed as subservient to the higher
goal of completing the Internal Market. Consumer protection
has not really been an autonomous objective in its own right
and there has been no clear vision as to what role consumer
interests should play in shaping technical legislation or
conformity assessment procedures. However, the designation of
consumer protection as an explicit Treaty objective in the
Maastricht European Council on 9-10 December 1991 adding a new
title XI to the Treaty of Rome might change that.
5.3. The external dimension.
Initially, third countries feared that the EC product
legislation and conformity assessment would be manipulated to
restrict their exports from penetrating the Community.
However, these concerns were unjustified. Third countries
benefit in equal messure from the greater ease of doing
business across intra-EC frontiers. Their products need only
to satisfy one, as opposed to twelve, set of technical
specifications and conformity assessment procedures.38
Now they realise this and shift attention to the small-
print of EC policy.
1). EC technical specifications would be a disguised external
barrier to trade.
In fact, the Community applies as much as is possible
international standards, (25 per cent of the current work
programme of CEN involves the direct adoption of international
standards, while the US has only implemented 17 out of 9400
international standards.)
Due to its voting power in international standards bodies
the EC would dictate the shape of international standards.
True, the EC and EFTA have a combined bloc vote of 18 against
the 1 vote for the US, but the Commission has signalled that
it may accept a single vote in the international
standardisation bodies. However, the national standardisation
boards this strongly opposed.
Furthermore, for many EC regulations and standards there
are no international precursors. Given the urgent need for
European Standards and harmonising legislation, the Community
has often been compelled to develop independent technical
specifications of its own rather than wait for international
standards.
It may be concluded that there does not seem to be any
substance to the fears that these specifications will be set
with the deliberate aim of impeding third country imports.
2). Third countries should have a window and a seat at the
table on EC policy.
The problem is that there is no national standardisation
body in the US, because ANSI encompasses only 17 per cent of
the bodies involved in developing standards.
Moreover, the Community would require a reciprocity seat
in the US. Since 1989 there is an exchange of information on
standardisation activities, which abated these pressures.
3). Testing and Certification of third country products.
The GATT Code on Technical Barriers prohibits any
discriminatory treatment when testing third country products
for conformity to EC rules. However, the fact that products
must be shipped to the EC for testing means that conformity
assessment costs are higher for third country products than
locally produced goods. Therefore, the GATT Code encourages
bilateral mutual recognition agreements, so that recognised
testing-houses in the exporting country can test exports for
conformity to the specifications applied in the importing
country, under the conditions that:
a). the testing bodies in the partner country are competent
and impartial, i.e. meet the criteria of EN 45000 and EN39
29000;
b). EC producers should derive corresponding benefits so that
their products can be tested in Europe for the American
market.
It may be concluded that the concerns about a hidden
Fortress Europe are wildly exaggerated.
6. Summarising conclusions.
A technical barrier-free Community is not a foregone
conclusion. Many challenges must be surmounted before the EC
policy is brought to full working order. In certain cases, a
strategic rethink may be needed. E.g., the CE mark raises more
problems than it solves. The EC would be well-advised to put
its faith in rigorous conformity assessment and stringent
product liability laws, rather than risk misleading consumers
and complicating product inspection.
Under the new approach, the Community has passed the buck
onto private sector organisations, i.e. the ESBs and the EOTC.
The Community may not be able to impose its desired solutions
on these organisations. The EC is largely impotent when it
comes to dealing with the shortage of European Standards. A
reorganisation of the European Standardisation Bodies could
result in a faster delivery of European Standards. However,
resource constraints are a more significant restrictive factor
on the European Standardisation Bodies than inefficient
working practices. The Green Paper tried to incite European
industry to finance a more-developed European Standardisation
infrastructure. However, industry's willingness to foot the
bill for European Standardisation is illusory. Given the key
role played by the European Stanardisation Bodies in
completing the Internal Market, the EC may have to consider
funding European Standardisation from its own pockets. The
Commission can ease the destiny of the ESBs by indicating
clearly what European Standards are needed to implement the
European technical legislation.
The Community has little direct influence on the
operation of the EOTC, which is working towards a situation in
which national quality marks will be awarded on the basis of
reliable test results carried out in the partner country. It
will take some time before the fledgling organisation will
have a real impact on the testing and certification methods
within the Community.
The drive to eliminate technical barriers has had several
spin-offs. It has increased pressures for a coherent EC
consumer protection policy and has prompted the EC to increase
cooperation with third countries on questions related to
technical barriers. Now that structures are in place, the EC
should develop a more pro-active policy in these fields.
The current frustration with the various obstacles
suggests that the Commission originally underestimated the40
task it has set itself. An effective policy cannot be
implemented overnight. Unfortunately, these obstacles mean
that techical barriers will be with us for some time more. A
technical barrier-free Community is a real, albeit not an
immediate possibility.
There is one unfortunate conclusion. It will take some
time before the spectre of technical barriers to intra-
Community trade is banished. In the meantime, industry will
have to live with the frustrations of a fragmented EC market,
although those who are waiting for a completely technical
barrier free Community should not hold their breath.1
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